Ideas from 'Nature's Metaphysics' by Alexander Bird [2007], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Nature's Metaphysics' by Bird,Alexander [OUP 2007,978-0-19-922701-3]].

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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula

9449	The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

9501	If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

9500	If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties

9502	There might be just one fundamental natural property

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties

9477	Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds

9490	The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself

9495	If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it

9492	Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates

9503	To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic

14540

Only real powers are fundamental [Mumford/Anjum]

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

9450	If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress

9498	The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional

9474	A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out

9475	A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent

9499	Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals

9486	Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular?

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

9472	Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity

9482	If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

9481	Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

9505	Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism

9491	Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation

9487	We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

9493	We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation

9494	Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

9507	Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws

9488	Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory

9496	That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is

9479	Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals

9473	Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals

9484	If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity

9506	Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws

23713

Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims

9489	Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time

9504	The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be